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Privacy and celebrity 2
by Michael Tugendhat QC
The author concludes his two-part study of privacy and celebrity by posing the 
vention of whether claims hsould be brought in libel or confidentiality.
ya s things stand, the lawyers choose the cause of 
L\ action depending on what the client says about the 
JL JLtruth of the information. If the client says the 
allegation is false, the claim is brought in libel. If the client 
says it is true, it is brought in confidentiality. But should 
the claimant have to say whether he has an eating disorder 
or not? And what if the publication complained of is a 
gross exaggeration? Suppose the client has only a small or 
temporary eating disorder, which cause of action does he 
choose? Does he have to confirm or deny?
THE PRINCIPLES OF LAW ON PERSONAL 
INFORMATION
These questions cannot be answered by citation of 
precedent. Judges will be guided by principle. So there are 
other prior questions of a higher order. Why has English 
law hitherto regarded truth as justifying publication of 
almost all personal information? What are the values of 
freedom of expression and reputation protected by libel? 
What are the values protected by privacy laws?
The value of reputation
It is easy to start with libel. The answer has been given 
by Lord Nicholls in Reynolds v Times [1999] 3 WLR 1010, 
1023. He said:
'Reputation is an integral and important part of the dignity of 
the individual. It also forms the basis of many decisions in a 
democratic society, which are fundamental to its well-being: 
whom to employ or work for, whom to promote, whom to do 
business with or to vote for. Once besmirched by an unfounded 
allegation in a national newspaper, a reputation can be damaged 
forever, especially if there is no opportunity to vindicate one's 
reputation. When this happens, society as well as the individual 
is the loser. For it should not be supposed that protection of 
reputation is a matter of importance only to the affected 
individual and his family. Protection of reputation is conducive to 
the public good. It is in the public interest that the reputation of 
public figures should not be debased falsely. In the political field, 
in order to make an informed, choice, the electorate needs to be 
able to identify the good as well as the bad. Consistently with 
these considerations, human rights conventions recognise that
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freedom of expression is not an absolute right. Its exercise may be 
subject to such restrictions as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the 
reputations ojothers.'
So libel protects a person against humiliation. It also 
protects society from making choices on a factual basis, 
which is false.
The value of freedom of expression
The value protected by freedom of expression is as easily- 
explained. In R v Secretary of State, ex parte Simms [1999] 3 
All ER 400, 407, Lord Steyn has famously said that:
'In a democracy it is the primary right: without it an effective 
rule of law is not possible... it promotes the self-fulfilment of 
individuals in society.... Thejreejlow of information and ideas 
informs political debate. It is a safety valve: people are more ready 
to accept decisions that go against them if they can in principle 
seek to influence them. It acts as a brake on the abuse of power 
by public ojficials. It facilitates the exposure of errors in the 
governance and administration of justice of the country.'
Lord Steyn was talking about public life. In private life 
the answers are the same. Freedom of expression deters 
inappropriate behaviour and encourages good behaviour 
(see ex parte Todner [1999] QB 966, 977; see also Francome 
at 898). Being talked about in the media may bring people
' o J o r r
honour or shame. People modify their behaviour 
accordingly. If people do not modify their behaviour, then 
the public discussion of it can lead to the law being 
invoked, or to changes in the law.
' o
The great American jurist Richard Posner has a blunter 
view. He says:
'To the extent that people conceal personal information in 
order to mislead, the economic casejbr according legal protection 
to such information is no better than that for permitting fraud in 
the sale of goods.' (Cited in R Wacks, Personal Information 
Privacy and the Law (OUP, 1989), p.28).
This is similar to the traditional common law principle 
that 'the law will not permit a man to recover damages in 
respect of an injury to a character which he either does 
not or ought not to possess'. (M'Pherson v Daniels (1829) 
10 B & C 263, 272, Littledale J). The PCC public interest 
test seems aimed to come as close to this view as Article 
8(2) allows.
The value of protecting private life
What then is the value of privacy laws protecting personal 
information? I suggest that the answer is very similar to the 
one given by Lord Nicholls in respect of defamation. Privacy 
is as much a part of the dignity of the individual as is 
reputation. So privacy too protects against humiliation. But 
there is a difference. It can be put this way:
If libel is necessary to protect the reputation that a 
person has in the minds of right thinking members of
society generally, then privacy is necessary to protect the 
reputation a person has in the minds of wrong thinking 
members of society. Privacy protects the individual against 
wrongful discrimination. It protects society from making 
decisions on a factual basis, wrhich is true but irrelevant.
The history of Article 8 supports this approach inMarckx 
v Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330, dissenting opinion of Sir G 
Fitzmaurice, para.7. The most sensitive information about 
a person concerns their health and sexual life, their 
religious and political opinions and their record of 
criminal convictions. This information is sensitive partly 
because it represents a substantial part of the identity of 
each of us. We need to develop our identities. We can only 
do so in private. But that is not the only importance of 
such information. True information on these topics can 
be, and has always been, used to discriminate. The worst 
examples were by the totalitarian regimes whose acts gave 
rise to the European Convention in 1948.
People are proud of the religious or ethnic groups from 
which their ancestors came. People hold strong political 
views. They may be at ease with their sexuality. All this may 
apply to minority groups. But individuals, and all right 
thinking members of society, are the losers if prejudiced 
members of society make decisions based on irrational 
prejudice.
Members of society are not all right thinking and tolerant 
people. Anti-discrimination legislation does not cover all 
fields. It is not always effective in the fields it does cover. If 
a person is not to be at risk of unfair discrimination by race, 
religion, sexuality, and political views, then there must be 
some protection against the disclosure of such information 
without a person's consent (see The Future of Privacy (1998) 
Demos Perri 6, p. 13 p.40ff. For discussions of the value of 
privacy see Eric Barendt, 'Privacy and the Press', Yearbook of 
Media and Entertainment Law 1995, Vol.1, p.25 at p.29 and 
Privacy and Loyalty (P Birks ed., OUP, 1997). Lord Nicholls 
said it is in the public interest that the reputation of public 
figures should not be debased falsely. It is just as much in 
the public interest that public figures should not be judged 
on information, which is true but clearly irrelevant to their 
public lives.
Race and sexuality have cost many careers. Glen Hoddle 
disclosed his beliefs linking disability to re-incarnation and 
lost his job with England's football team   see Sir Patrick 
Elias and Jason Coppel, Freedom of Expression and Freedom of 
Information (J. Beatson and Y. Cripps ed., OUP, 2000). It 
was hard to see the public interest in that.
Reconciling the values
So it comes down to this. Privacy laws and freedom of 
expression are both necessary for the dignity of the 
individual. Privacy prevents discrimination, which is 
unfair, so long as it is limited to matters which are of no
' o
legitimate concern to other members of society. Freedom 
of expression discourages behaviour which other members.
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of society consider to be inappropriate or disreputable. It 
also enables society to establish what behaviour is 
acceptable, and what is not. Wide ranging discussion in 
the media is necessary tor this.
The question for the judges is then: by what test do they 
decide what information is to be protected, or whether 
behaviour is a misdemeanour or disreputable? Two types 
of answer are possible, one closed, one open. The closed 
test will draw up a list of topics to be protected, e.g. the 
kinds of information given in the data protection 
legislation or the Codes. It has the advantage of certainty 
and clarity. But it risks becoming out of date.
The open test for privacy was favoured by Calcutt and 
follows the libel model: does the information relate to 
those aspects of the claimant's life which reasonable 
members of society would respect as being such that an 
individual is ordinarily entitled to keep to himself, 
whether or not they relate to his mind or body, his home, 
to his family, to other personal relationships, or to his 
correspondence or documents?
In short, did the claimant have a reasonable or 
legitimate expectation of privacy? What is private or what 
is disreputable, like what is defamatory, is sensitive to time 
and culture, and can be worked out on a case-by-case 
basis - see Calcutt, para. 12.17; David Eady QC [1996] 
EHRLR 243, 250; Wacks, Personal Information Privacy and 
the Law (OUR 1989) p.24. Lord Woolf MR also regards 
detail in this field to be undesirable: R v BSC, ex parte BBC 
[2000] 3 All ER 989, para. 12.
THE PRIORITY OF FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION
There are a number of cases where the principles of 
libel have been held to trump the principles protected by 
other causes of action. This is an exception to the general 
principle that a claimant can choose what cause of action 
to sue on. But where a person's reputation is involved that 
rule has not been applied. A priority has been given to 
freedom of expression, which has generally precluded 
reliance on any causes of action, which a claimant might 
choose other than libel.
Sometimes the claimant's choice has been respected. 
The difficulty is that in these cases judges have not 
recognised that respect for private life is a value which 
English law upholds. Where freedom of expression has 
not prevailed the decision has been based on other values 
(such as the public interest in upholding the institution of 
marriage, or some illegality on the defendant's part). 
Changes in society have made it difficult now to identify 
such values (see Stephens v Avery [1988] Ch 449).
The Duchess of Argyll did obtain an injunction [1967] 
Ch 302, in spite of the fact that the Duke had relied on 
truth ([1967] Ch at p.309b) - there is no reference to the 
point in the report of the plaintiff's argument or the
judgment. The Duchess conceded that she could not ask 
for interlocutory relief in respect of statements which 
were 'merely defamatory', and not confidential. The 
injunction applied to confidential information. It is 
implied that the information was defamatory and 
immoral by the standards of the day. But the 
confidentiality arose out of the relationship of marriage. 
The public interest in the institution of marriage prevailed 
over the principle that truth justifies any publication.
More recently John Francome's choice to sue in 
confidentiality was upheld. He obtained an injunction 
preventing defamatory disclosures about him. The 
information had been derived from illegal bugging of his
O CO O
home, and that illegality was decisive in Francome v Mirror 
[1984] 1 WER892, 899.
In Sim v Heinz [1959] 1 WLR 3 1 3, an actor applied for 
an injunction to restrain the appropriation of his voice tor 
advertising. The decision prevented the development in 
England of what the Americans call the tort of 
appropriation of image. Because no prior restraint 
injunction is available in libel, the claimant abandoned a 
libel claim, and relied only on passing off. Interim 
injunctions are commonly granted for passing off. He 
argued that it does not matter if the damage in the 
passing-off action is the same as the damage in the libel 
action, as he was entitled to the injunction on the basis of 
his claim in respect of passing off. The Court of Appeal 
overruled his choice. It held that it would be 
inappropriate to grant an injunction in passing off, when 
it would be refused in respect of the same facts if the 
claim were pursued in libel. A publicity right has since 
been created on a self-regulatory basis by the Advertising 
Standards Authority Code, para. 13.1 (b).
Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 1 WER760, 764, marks the 
high point of prioritising freedom of expression. In that 
case the confidential relationship was employment. Lord 
Brabourne also failed in Brabourne v Hough [1981] FSR 79. 
A group of pop stars seem to have behaved very badly on 
an aeroplane. They tried to stop their former press agent
from revealing to the general public what had occurred.o o
Lord Denning referred to the rule against prior restraint 
in defamation and applied it to confidentiality saying:
'As there should be "truth in advertising, " so there should be truth 
in publicity. The public should not be misled. So it seems to me 
that the breach of confidential information is not a ground for 
granting an injunction.'
It is not clear what Lord Denning meant by 'truth in 
advertising'. The Advertising Standards Authority Code in 
para.7.1 imposes such a requirement, but it is not a rule 
of law. Neither the Code, nor Richard Posner's analogy
' Cv
with fraud in the sale of goods, provides an obvious 
explanation for the refusal of the injunction in that case.
It is hard to see how prioritising freedom of expression 
over all other values can be compatible with the ECHR. 13
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As Sedley LJ has said:
'The European Court of Human Rights has always recognised 
the high importance ofjree media of communication in a 
democracy, but its jurisprudence does not   and could not 
consistently with the Convention itself  give Article 10(1) the 
presumptive priority which is given, for example, to the First 
Amendment in the jurisprudence of the United States' courts. 
(See Douglas v Hello! [2001] 2 WLR 992, para. 135)
A case such as Woodward v Hutchins might now be 
decided on different principles. A court today might still 
refuse an injunction on the basis that publicity would 
discourage disreputable behaviour. Alternatively, an 
injunction might be granted on the basis that the duties of 
an employee override his right to freedom of expression 
(see Rommelfanger v Germany (Application 12242/86); Vogt 
v Germany (1995) 21 EHRR 205).
The way to reconcile the competing values is suggested 
by Griffiths LJ in the obscure case of Microdata Information 
Services v Rivendale [1991] FSR 681, 688. The claim had 
nothing to do with personal information or celebrity. An 
injunction was granted to restrain a slander of title over 
computer software. Lord Griffiths held the court must 
decide whether the 'principal purpose' of the claimant 
was to obtain damages for defamation. That subjective 
and value free test has proved controversial   see Western 
Front Ltd v Vestron Inc. [1987] FSR 66, Peter Gibson J; 
Gatley para.25.15. But Lord Griffiths added, obiter, 
words that point a way forward:
'If... the court is satisfied that there is some serious interest 
to be protected such as confidentiality, and that outweighs 
considerations ofjree speech then the court will grant an 
injunction.'
Although claimants have not been permitted by the 
courts to use other causes of action to avoid the principles 
of the law of libel, claimants who do sue in libel are 
permitted some measure of choice as to how to put their 
case within the scope of a libel action. Tom Cruise and 
Nicole Kidman chose to sue on a publication about their 
marriage, but not on other parts of the same publication, 
which concerned their religious beliefs. The courts 
upheld their right to make that choice ([1999] 2 WLR 
327). It would be consistent with that principle, as well as 
with Article 8, that they should also have been free to 
choose a cause of action in which truth would not have 
been an absolute defence. Whether their behaviour as a 
married couple was of public interest could then be 
determined in accordance with Article 8(2), as 
interpreted in the Codes.
LIBEL, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND 
PRIVACY ^
It is time to look again at the absolute defence of truth 
in libel. It is time to look too at those parts of libel law 
which do already recognise the right to private life.
Right thinking members of society
The most obvious protection that libel gives to privacy 
is in the test of what is defamatory. The test has been 
stretched to protect privacy. The test is in principle: do 
the words complained of lower the claimant's reputation 
in the minds of right thinking members of society 
generally? But the test has been found satisfied in cases 
where the only proper response of a right-thinking person 
to the publication complained of would in fact be not 
contempt, but sympathy or indifference. That cannot be 
right.
In 1934 Princess Youssoupoff was awarded £28,000 
(about £600,000 today) for the suggestion in a film that 
she had been raped: see Youssoupoff v MGM (1934) 50 TLR 
581.
Elton John has given two more recent examples, both 
landmarks in the law. Calcutt, para. 1.5 and The Times, 21 
April 2001, p.3, told of a £1 million out-of-court libel 
settlement in the 1980s, following stories in The Sun about 
Elton John's private life. Calcutt also cited the observation 
of Sir Louis Blom-Cooper, then Chairman of the Press 
Council, on jury awards of damages. Sir Louis thought 
that large awards reflected the juries' disapproval of the 
improper disclosure by newspapers of intimate details of 
an individual's private life (Calcutt, para.7.25). Elton 
John's case may have influenced Calcutt's proposal for the 
setting up of the PCC.
In 1991 Jason Donovan was awarded £200,000 in an 
action against a magazine, which had suggested that he
O O ' CO
was a liar and a hypocrite to deny that he was gay (The 
Times, 4 April 1992, and see Carter-Ruck, Libel and Slander 
(5th ed.), p. 666). But if he had been gay, would he have 
been a hypocrite if he had not admitted it? If information 
is personal or private, then, as the Rehabilitation of Offenders 
Act shows, a proper legal response may be that the 
individual does not have to confirm or deny its truth. Is it 
really hypocrisy to conceal that which other people have 
no right to know?
Instead of stretching the test of what is defamatory, it 
might be better to regard claimants such as these as having 
suffered an infringement of their privacy, not an injury 
their reputation. Privacy can be infringed by a 
false allegation as well as by a true one (Judge Franchise 
Tulkens, Conference Reports: Freedom of Expression and the 
Right to Privacy, (Strasbourg 23 September 1999 
DH-MM), (2000) 7 Council of Europe, 
www.humanrights.coe.int/media, at p.28-9, the Article 8 
privacy right includes the right protection of honour and 
reputation).
The controversy over truth as an absolute defence
Cases like Youssuopojf have troubled committees 
considering reform of the law of libel (Gatley, para. 11.1). 
They may open the way for a rule that truth is not an
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absolute defence in cases where there is an overriding 
need to protect the private lives of individuals. The ECHR 
may require that the law be changed if the UK is to fulfil 
its obligations (see the Sedley LJ, Freedom, Law and Justice, 
The Hamlyn Lecture, Sweet & Maxwell, 1999).
In 1843 the Select Committee of the House of Lords on 
the Law of Defamation recommended a change in the law. 
They considered that there were many cases where truth 
should not be a defence to an imputation relating to some 
personal defect or error of conduct long since atoned for 
and forgotten. The requirement to prove public interest 
was adopted only in respect of criminal libel (Gatley, 
para. 11.1, footnote 5. Some Australian jurisdictions have 
confined the defence to cases of public benefit or public 
interest).
In 1948 the Porter Committee considered the 
hypothetical example of a woman who in her adolescence 
bore an illegitimate child (Cmd.7536 (1948), paras 74-78 
cited the Faulks Report, Cmnd. 5909, para. 139). They 
sympathised with the view that the defendant should show 
there was a public interest, but rejected it on the ground 
that the task of the author or journalist would become 
impracticable. They did not address their minds to the 
more limited point that the defence of justification could 
be excluded where to allow it would be an unwarranted 
interference with a person's private life.
In 1975 the Faulks Committee (Cmnd. 5909 (1975), 
paras 137-140) recognised that a requirement to show 
public interest might deter people from resuscitating tales 
of crimes or misconduct happily long forgotten. They 
rejected the proposal on the grounds that such a provision 
would apply generally to all defamatory publications. They 
did not address their minds to a limited qualification to 
the defence of justification excluding unwarranted 
interference with a person's private life. They were 
concerned about cases such as Youssoupojf v MGN (1934) 
50 TLR 581, and others involving diseases for which there 
is no moral responsibility. Though recognising such cases 
to be a problem, they suggested that 'these unfortunate 
people' resort to their claim in injurious falsehood if they 
had none in defamation: an impractical suggestion, given 
the impossibility of proving malice in most cases.
The defence of fair comment on a matter of public 
interest has given rise to a number of cases where the 
courts have had to decide that certain matters relating to 
public figures are nevertheless part of their private lives, 
not matters of public interest (Gatley, paras 12.29, 
12.39).
The law of libel also recognises the right to privacy in 
cases concerning evidence admissible in reduction of 
damages. In Plato Films Ltd v Speidel [1961] AC 1090 at 
p.l 125, Lord Simonds said:
'There may, in the result, be cases in which a rogue survives 
both evidence of general bad reputation and, where he has gone
into the witness-box, a severe cross-examination nominally 
directed to credit, and recovers more damages than he should. 
But I would rather have it so than that the law should permit 
the injustice and, indeed, the cruelty of an attack upon a 
plaintijfjbr offences real or imaginary which, if they ever were 
committed, may have been known to Jew and by them have been 
Jbrgotten.'
The cruelty and injustice of raking up offences known 
to few and by them forgotten is referred to in French law 
as the 'droit a 1'oubli' or the right to be forgotten (seeto to v
Kayser, La Protection de la Vie Prive par le Droit (3rd ed., 
Economica, 1995), para. 118, p.217).
A right to rely on truth, which is qualified where there 
is an unwarranted interference with the private life of the 
claimant, appears to be the law in Germany (Birgit 
Brommerkamp, above, p.96), and France (Kayser, above, 
para.83 p. 168, para. 123, p.224), as well as in some 
Australian jurisdictions (Gatley, para. 11.1, footnote 5).
CONCLUSION
All the examples at the start of this two-part article have 
in fact been taken from libel actions. None are from 
confidentiality cases. The claims proceeded where the 
claimants were able and willing to say the allegations were 
untrue. But if private life is to be respected, we must ask 
ourselves: is it right that claimants should have to say 
whether the allegations are true or untrue? Is it right too to
go on stretching the test of what is defamatory to cover 
illness or sexual orientation?
It must be right that the values of freedom ofto
expression, respect for private life, and public interest 
should now be recognised for the principles they are. 
They should be candidly and explicitly addressed. Until 
that is done, neither the law of confidentiality, nor the law 
of libel will be easy to reconcile with Articles 8 and 10.
If the laws of confidentiality and libel are reconciled 
with the ECHR and with each other, it should make little 
difference to the standards of the British media. 
Journalists working in the UK for newspapers and 
broadcasters are already bound to comply with the Codes. 
It is hard to see why other writers and artists should be 
free of any restriction at all.
Celebrity is a democratic honour awarded through the 
media. Celebrities should not be humiliated or exploited. 
They should not suffer discrimination based on prejudice. 
But neither should they enjoy their honour by 
disreputable conduct and deception. It is the role of the 
media to ensure that they do not. ©
Michael Tugendhat QC
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